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Abstract 
 
Based on first-hand account, this paper offers evidence on price setting and price adjustment 
mechanisms that were illegally employed under the Soviet planning and rationing regime. The 
evidence is anecdotal, and is based on personal experience during the years 1960–1971 in the 
Republic of Georgia. The description of the social organization of the black markets and other 
illegal economic activities that I offer depicts the creative and sophisticated ways that were used 
to confront the shortages created by the inefficient centrally-planned command economic price 
system with its distorted relative prices. The evidence offers a glimpse of quite explicit micro-
level evidence on various types of behavior and corruption that were common in Georgia. Rent-
seeking behavior, however, led to emergence of remarkably well-functioning and efficiency 
enhancing black markets. The evidence, thus, underscores once again the role of incentives in a 
rent-seeking society. 
 
 
JEL Classification: B14; D30; D73; E64; H26; H40; K42; O17; P20; P26; Z13  
 
Key Words: Corruption; Black market; Bribe; Price system; Distorted relative prices; USSR; 
Command economy 
 
 
*  Tel: +972 3531 8331; Fax: +972 3738 4034. 
Email address: Levyda@mail.biu.ac.il. 
 
 
 
 
Forthcoming: 
 
European Journal of Political Economy, 2007
 1
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“Science requires more resources of the language than raw sense data and first-order predicate logic… Economics is a science, 
and a jolly good one, too.  But a serious argument in economics will use metaphors and stories as well—not for ornament or 
teaching alone but for the very science.”                                                        Deirdre N. McCloskey (1998, p. 19) 
 
“The tendency of economists to treat statistical studies as automatically more informative than narrative studies has no 
justification in general and is clearly pernicious in contexts… where the data are so poor.”         Steven Durlauf (2001, p. 67) 
 
 
Although corruption is believed to be a widespread phenomenon (see, for example, 
Marjit, et al. 2000; Abed and Gupta, 2002; and Foellmi and Oechslin, 2006), direct hard data on 
corruption and its prevalence is scarce because of its illegal nature. The absence of hard 
quantitative data on corruption makes it difficult to bring corruption-related debates—and more 
generally public debates related to unethical behavior—to the forefront of the policy discussion 
agenda.  
Some public institutions and private organizations have been trying to fill this void by 
producing cross-country indicators of corruption. These indicators have been used in recent 
empirical studies that explore the economic effects of corruption or the determinants of 
corruption in cross-sections of countries. Examples of such indicators include the International 
Country Risk Guide Index (ICRGI) which is published by Political Risk Services, Inc., the 
Institute for Management Development Index (IMDI), which is included in the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook, and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which is compiled by 
Transparency International. These indicators are typically constructed using various forms of 
surveys that include businessmen, political analysts, and general public, and where the 
respondents are asked to rank order countries based on their perceived level of corruption, the 
rule of law, risk of contract repudiation, quality of bureaucracy, quality of political, legal, law-
enforcement, and judiciary institutions, etc. (Herzfeld and Weiss, 2003).1 
Given the illegal nature of most forms of corruption, there is little hope of obtaining direct 
evidence or actual hard quantitative data on corruption from any official government source such 
as government statistical agencies and other data collection institutions on a large scale.2 
Although anecdotal evidence about prevalence of corruption abounds, unfortunately such 
                                                 
1 See Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) for more details on these indexes. Other examples that use these indexes include Mauro 
(1995, 1997), Gupta, et al. (2001), and Paldam (2002). See also the studies published in the four-volume set on The Politics of 
Corruption, edited by Williams (2000) and Williams, et al. (2000), which also include several empirical studies. 
2 Recent studies conducted by the economists of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, report some quantitative 
estimates of corruption-related economic activities in some developing and underdeveloped countries. See, for example, the 
studies by Abed and Gupta (2002) and Reinikka and Svenssen (2001), as well as other studies cited therein. 
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evidence is rarely published in academic studies. Indeed, only a limited number of published 
academic studies have offered anecdotal evidence about corruption. The few examples that I was 
able to locate include Simis (1982), Hillman and Schnytzer (1986), Lambsdorff (1998), Naylor 
(1998), Gupta, et al. (2001), and Easterly (2001). 
A likely reason for the scarcity of anecdotal evidence in academic economic research 
might be the economists’ general lack of enthusiasm about this type of evidence. That is because 
it is virtually impossibile to falsificfy anecdotal evidence, making such evidence scientifically 
doubtful. However, there are some well-known exceptions of studies that rely only on anecdotal 
evidence, although most of these studies are historical in nature. Perhaps the best known example 
is Radford’s (1945) paper on a prisoners’ of war (P.O.W) camp. In his paper, Radford offers a 
fascinating eyewitness account of the economic organization of a P.O.W camp during World War 
II. According to his account, in the informal and mostly exchange-based markets that developed 
at the P.O.W camp, cigarettes emerged endogenously as having the role of money and its three 
functions by serving as a medium of exchange, as a unit of account, and as a store of value.3 
Radford’s paper offers only narrative anecdotal evidence. Nevertheless, the study has never been 
criticized for this, as far as I know. To the contrary, it is considered a classic study, and it has 
been widely cited, especially by introductory and intermediate textbook authors.4 
Recently the economics discipline has been more open to the possibility that anecdotal 
evidence may fruitfully supplement more standard and more commonly accepted statistical 
evidence. That is particularly true in cases where data from standard sources are non-existent. For 
example, Romer and Romer (1989, p. 167) suggest that narrative approach “…allows a vast body 
of information that cannot be employed in conventional statistical tests, to be brought to bear 
on…[a] question.” McCloskey (1990, 1998) and Durlauf (2001) have also advocated quite 
forcefully a wider use of anecdotal evidence in economic research. See also the discussions in 
Jönsson (1993), Lukka and Kasanen (1995), and Zbaracki, et al. (2004, 2006). 
In this paper, I offer some direct and quite explicit anecdotal evidence on various types of 
behavior in the Republic of Georgia during the years 1960–1971. Several existing studies explore 
the nature of corruption in the former Soviet Union, and attempt to explain it as well as its 
economic consequences. See, for example, Simes (1975), Simis (1977, 1982), Grossman (1977), 
Bergson (1984), Hillman and Schnytzer (1986), and Levin and Satarov (2000).5 
                                                 
3 In several barter exchange experiments conducted by Fried and Levy (1995) and Levy and Bergen (1993), Mexican dry beans 
emerged endogenously as playing the role of money. According to their account, the beans were used in transactions as a medium 
of exchange as well as a unit of account in their classroom, exchange-based market economy. 
4 For other examples of studies that use narrative anecdotal type of evidence, see the collection of readings in Kohler (1968). 
5 For an analysis of corruption in the post-transition Russian Federation, see Levin and Satarov (2000), who offer an interesting 
discussion of the institutional pathologies in the Soviet economy prior to the collapse of the USSR, pathologies that contributed 
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In the paper, I tell the story of my family, how we dealt with the constant shortages and 
inadequate services the official centrally planned markets of Georgia could offer, and how we 
participated in Georgia’s illegal black market economy. As Hillman (2004, p. 1067) notes, “The 
people who can best describe corruption are those themselves engaged in corruption.”  Indeed, 
the evidence I offer is a first hand-account, based on my and my family’s actual daily experiences 
in Georgia. 
The paper makes two specific contributions. First, unlike most of the existing studies of 
corruption, I offer a detailed and fairly rich micro-level narrative account of various types of 
illegal transactions that were taking place in the corrupt black markets of Georgia as part of 
routine everyday life. Second, I primarily focus on the unofficial price setting and price 
adjustment mechanisms used at the black markets. The latter is particularly useful because the 
price system is the single most important institution in a market based economy. 
The evidence on corruption that I document for the Republic of Georgia confirms that, in 
the absence of free markets, wage and price systems do not reflect true relative prices according 
to the true market conditions. In such environments, rent-seeking behavior of individuals can lead 
to a development of black markets where unofficial prices and bribe rates will clear the markets, 
because the black market prices and quantities respond to changes in market conditions to reflect 
the true relative valuations. 
Before proceeding, I shall note two caveats. First, the evidence I offer here on the 
corruption in Georgia should not be viewed as representative of corruption in socialist countries 
in general or even in other republics of the former Soviet Union in particular. The fact is that 
Georgia was one of the most corrupt, or perhaps even the most corrupt amongst the 15 republics 
of the former USSR, and it is unclear to what extent and to what depth the various forms of 
corruption that existed in Georgia’s economy also existed in other locations. 
Second, although I characterize Georgian corruption as driven primarily by the rigidities 
of the centralized price system and the rent seeking motives of bribe-maximizing bureaucrats, it 
should be noted that the corruption in Georgia likely has socio-cultural roots as well. For 
example, the corruption seems to persist even in contemporary Georgia despite the process of 
large-scale privatization and other free market reforms implemented by Georgia’s current reform-
minded government. Indeed, as recently as 2003, Georgia’s economy was still ranked amongst 
the top 6 most corrupt economies in the world by Transparency International’s CPI.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, which constitutes the main body of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
significantly to the persistence of corruption in the republics of the former Soviet Union until recently. For a survey of the 
theoretical literature on corruption, see Aidt (2003), who offers a detailed and thorough analysis of the existing theoretical models 
of corruption, possible causes of corruption, as well as its possible consequences.  
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paper, I provide a narrative anecdotal account of numerous episodes of illegal and corrupt 
economic transactions and activities in Georgia. In section 3, I offer interpretation of the evidence 
by asking whether corruption in Georgia was efficient in some sense. In section 4, I discuss 
ethical and moral aspects of the corruption in Georgia. In section 5, I address the issue of 
generalizability of the evidence reported in the paper and explore possible explanations to the 
persistence of corruption in today’s Georgia. In section 6, I consider the admissibility and 
potential benefits of anecdotal evidence for studying corruption. I conclude in section 7 with a 
brief summary of the findings and some caveats.  
 
2. Evidence on corruption 
In this section, I offer direct and quite explicit anecdotal evidence on the economic 
corruption of Georgia’s markets and institutions by providing a detailed account of various kinds 
of illegal economic transactions and activities my siblings were engaged in. While these 
transactions usually included common types of corrupt activities such as bribe payments, 
embezzlement, and fraud, unfortunately sometimes also included were dishonest acts of cheating, 
scams, rip offs, etc. I begin the discussion by offering a brief description of my family 
background and the town in which we lived, and by providing some general information about 
the market structure of Georgia’s centrally planned economy.  
 
2.1 Georgia’s centralized command market system 
Georgia, like the rest of the 14 republics in the former Soviet Union, did not have a free 
market economy. Rather, the Georgian economy was a centrally planned command economy. 
That is, government officials and bureaucrats and the members of the communist party apparatus 
functionaries made the decisions regarding the products and services to be produced, how much 
will be produced, and for whom will be the output produced. In western style free market 
economies, in contrast, market forces along with the flexible price system are the mechanisms 
that determine the answers to these key questions. 
Given that market forces in Georgia were not allowed to function freely, decision-makers 
such as firms, families, and individuals, had to find ways around the restrictions imposed by the 
centrally planned totalitarian economic structure, and its inefficient price system. As 
demonstrated below, if the price and wage systems are not flexible enough to reflect the 
dynamics of open market forces by adjusting to changes in market conditions, then market 
participants have powerful incentives to find alternative mechanisms to overcome the problems 
and limitations that are caused by these price and wage system inflexibilities. 
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In the republics of the former Soviet Union, the wage rate in an organization was set in 
such a way that it was equal for everyone with the same level of education, experience, etc., and 
this despite the fact that not everyone was equally productive. Moreover, these wages were set at 
a very low level. The wages, which at the time were in the range of 30–60 Rubles, could 
theoretically be sufficient if all goods and services were indeed priced at the official rate. That 
was not the case, however; 30 Rubles would not cover even one week’s expenses on minimal 
necessities for an average family. That is because to accomplish anything, bribing and side-
payments to government bureaucrats and functionaries, and quite often even to police officers, 
were necessary. Therefore, in Georgia, the problems created by central planning were resolved, at 
least in part, by developing a black market, where goods and services were traded at the black 
market prices that typically included bribe premiums that reflected the true relative valuations of 
these goods and services.  
 
2.2 Food chain in black markets 
I was born and raised in Tskhakaya (since Georgia regained its independence from 
Russia, the town’s name has been changed to Senaki), a small town in the western part of 
Georgia, close to Kutaisi—the regional capital. Three of my brothers worked at government 
stores, selling various types of clothing, shoes, fabrics, etc. The stores were all located in the local 
market, called “bazari” in Georgian. The bazari was physically set up as a big circle. In the 
center of bazari was the fruits and vegetables market, where local farmers from the outskirts of 
Tskhakaya would sell their wares. Around the circle, along the bazari’s walls were scattered 
various kinds of stores, such as hardware stores, clothing stores, barber shops, book shops, etc., 
as well as a few restaurants. In addition, there were designated areas for selling milk products, 
flour and related products, chicken and other meat products, etc.  
The stores were all government-owned and operated in a similar fashion. No private 
ownership was allowed or recognized. All goods and services were produced by government 
owned factories and manufacturing plants, or imported to Georgia by government import 
agencies. The prices of the goods and services were set by government officials. For example, the 
prices the barbers charged were set by government directives. Similarly, the prices of shirts, 
trousers, shoes, and other goods sold at these stores were also set by government officials. The 
proceeds from sales were forwarded to the government office. The employees of the shops were 
paid on a monthly basis by the local government salary payment offices. 
One main problem with the system was the inadequate level of the salaries. Therefore, the 
workers had to find some source of supplementary income. And everyone found some way of 
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doing it. For example, the Kolkhoz farmers would sell some of their produce at the bazari at the 
“free market” price, rather than sending it all to government storage facilities, which paid them a 
low fixed price, regardless of the quality of the produce. The market price typically was much 
higher than the government regulators assessed. Therefore, the farmers who sold their produce at 
the bazari would pocket nice profits.6 
Although the bazari’s existence was legal and authorized, the individuals who came to 
sell their wares there had to bribe various officials, because otherwise, given the lack of another 
market, they could be denied entrance to the market, or just be harassed by nosy market officials 
and policemen. Thus the bazari authorities would happily allow people to bring to the market any 
legal, border-line legal, or even illegal (e.g., counterfeit) merchandise, as long as they were 
properly compensated for it. The bribe payments could take various forms, but typically, they 
would include a side-payment (in addition to the official nominal fee) to the person at the 
entrance to the market, who exerted much power because he could deny entrance to the 
merchants or he could report them to the police. Also, there was a limit to the quantity of 
merchandise the sellers could bring to the market, and bribing the person at the gate was the only 
way of eliminating that barrier. Various bazari officials and controllers and often the policemen 
as well would personally go around the merchant tables scattered in the bazari and collect their 
bribe payments, sometimes in cash but quite often in kind also. 
The employees at these shops and stores used various methods to supplement their 
miserable government-paid salaries, but most often they would inflate the prices of almost 
everything they were selling, often by as much as 200–300 percent above the official price. 
However, they could not pocket all the profit. Instead they shared it with the store manager, who 
shared it with his supervisor, who shared it with the local police station staff, etc. This way, 
everybody in the “food chain” received his or her share with the implicit understanding that as 
long as everyone played according to the rules, there was no reason to disrupt this remarkably 
efficient method of income redistribution. 
A model of hierarchically structured corrupt economy with a similar “food chain” element 
is considered by Hillman and Katz (1987), who use it to study dissipation of rent and revenue in a 
corrupt economy where, because of bribe and other transfer payments, the social cost of 
contestability of a rent or revenue encompasses resources used in more than one contest. To 
motivate their hierarchical structured model, they refer to variety of scenarios that quite resemble 
the realities we faced in Georgia. Examples include a lowly customs official who is obliged to 
pay a proportion of his take of bribes to a superior, or a local councilman who is assisting with a 
                                                 
6 Hillman and Schnytzer (1986) and Grossman (1977) also note that this phenomenon existed in the Republic of Georgia.  
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change in a zoning ordinance and makes further payments within the local government hierarchy 
to facilitate the rezoning request, etc.   
I can offer many such examples from Georgia. For instance, the medical services were 
supposed to be free. However, to obtain satisfactory medical care, bribes and other types of 
under-the-table payments in cash or in kind were necessary. For example, when I was about 11 
years old, my older brother and I were sent to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, to undergo a 
tonsillectomy, a surgical procedure that was routinely done in those days to every child. When we 
visited the doctor’s office at the hospital, the first thing my brother did was to discreetly hand him 
an envelope, saying, “Our parents have asked us to give this envelope to you.” The envelope 
contained 300 Rubles. Georgian doctors never refused to accept these kinds of gifts.7 Naturally, 
some part of these gifts likely ended up in the hands of the hospitals’ chief doctors and 
administrators.  
Similarly, in order to enter an institute of higher education, payments to the “right people” 
were absolutely necessary.8 Incredibly perhaps, bribing teachers was common even after entering 
the university. For example, students taking written exams would often put in their examination 
notebooks some amount (20–30 Rubles perhaps) before handing in their exam notebooks. One of 
my brothers was able to improve his grades in his high school diploma after haggling (literally!) 
with his teacher on the price. It turns out that the teacher was asking for 4 Rubles for each extra 
point while my brother was only offering 2 Rubles. In the end, they have settled on 3 Rubles per 
point. Thus, for example, improving a grade from 3 to 5 on a scale of 2 (“fail”)–5 (“excellent”), 
cost my brother a mere 6 Rubles.9 My family members were not unique. As far as we know, 
everybody was doing this. In fact, through word of mouth communication, people would often 
share with one another information about the market bribe rate. i.e., how much money a 
particular public official was taking.  
 
2.3 Inflating the official prices 
Under-reporting and/or inflating the official prices and pocketing the extra income was 
the standard as well as the norm amongst the stores’ and shops’ managers and employees. Much 
                                                 
7 As one of the anonymous referees noted, this kind of payment prior to the receipt of a medical treatment is perhaps different 
from the gifts medical doctors often receive (usually in kind but sometimes also in monetary terms) after a successful treatment, 
such as after a successful surgical procedure, as a recognition of a job-well-done. These types of post-medical treatment gifts are 
quite common in many countries, and it is unclear whether they should be considered a bribe. 
8 The bribe rate for entering the university was in the range of 1,000–1,500 rubles. In addition, often, a payment in kind was also 
necessary. For example, it was well-known in our community that to purchase an admission to university, it was necessary to give 
a gift of dvoika (2-piece suit) or preferably troika (3-piece suit) to the university rector’s wife. My parents often expressed regret 
and disappointment for not being able to send my brothers and sisters to the university. The necessary bribe rate was far too high 
for them and thus not within their reach. 
9 Another brother of mine used chacha—Georgian homemade vodka, to improve his high school diploma grades. Although 
chacha was sometimes used, money was still the primary means of bribe payments. See section 2.10 below. 
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of the merchandise these stores sold was produced by Georgian or Russian government 
manufacturing plants, although some proportion of the merchandise was often imported, typically 
from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and other east European countries. 
Government officials, who typically were appointed directly by the local or the regional (e.g., 
district-level) Central Committees of the Soviet Communist Party were in charge of setting the 
prices of the merchandise. They would set the prices without having any clue about the demand 
conditions in the market or about the costs of production or importation. In fact, the merchandise 
was almost always under-priced giving the store employees powerful incentives to inflate the 
official prices and pocket the profits. 
My siblings faced these kinds of situations on a regular basis. For example, a line of work 
shirts would arrive with the price tags attached to the shirt buttons. In addition to the price 
information, these tags would also contain information on the manufacturing date and place, 
washing and ironing instructions, etc. Now, with a price tag of 4 Rubles per shirt, these shirts 
were grossly under-priced. Therefore, my brothers would order new price tags from a local 
government printing shop. The new price tags would be identical to the original price tags, with 
only one difference: instead of 4 Rubles, the tags would indicate a price of 10 Rubles or even 12 
Rubles. Then I, along with my younger brother, Joseph, would remove the original tags and 
replace them with the new tags. We used to inflate this way the official prices dozens of times 
each year, with the delivery of almost every new shipment of merchandise. 
Now, formally the government printing presses were prohibited from printing any non-
official government document, and certainly from printing fake price tags for illegally selling 
illegally-manufactured products at inflated prices. Naturally, my brothers had to bribe the 
printing press managers and especially their director, to secure their full cooperation. 
Usually, the size of the bribe that was needed for obtaining a given good or service was 
not negotiated explicitly. Instead, it seemed that both parties somehow knew what the “right 
price,” i.e., the equilibrium bribe rate was. This knowledge appeared to be a result of the process 
of accumulation of information over time and learning, through recurring interactions, about the 
appropriate size of the bribes in different settings and circumstances. 
The method of illegally obtaining goods and services in exchange for bribes functioned 
because everybody that was a part of the group or the circle received his or her share of the 
profits. The profit sharing mechanism was designed in such a way that all participants had an 
incentive to play the game according to the rules. It worked precisely because everybody 
benefited and thus nobody had an incentive to disrupt its smooth functioning. High-rank 
government officials, the policemen, and the managers at the store-level, all were engaged in 
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enriching themselves by dividing the surplus generated. Activities described below and other 
similar transactions that Georgians were engaged in were thus primarily driven by rent-seeking 
motives. However, also, and perhaps most importantly, by introducing market incentives, sellers 
ensured that goods were delivered to the buyers that valued the goods most. Hence, if this was 
corruption, the type of corruption was of the efficiency enhancing type.10 
In the particular case of my family, following the unwritten profit-sharing rules, my 
brothers would share the 200–300 percent “profit” with all “club members.” For example, if on a 
4 Ruble shirt my brother made 8 Rubles profit, then he would keep 1 Ruble and give 7 Rubles to 
the store manager. He would pocket one Ruble, and 6 Rubles would go to the director of the 
bazari. The director and his office employees would keep 2–3 Rubles, and the rest would go to 
the local police station chief, who would share it further with his fellow policemen as well as 
with his supervisors in the regional capital.11 
 
2.4 Price adjustment “under the table” 
Often, the decision by how much to inflate the price was left for the last moment. I took 
an active role in this kind of instantaneous price adjustment, which was done under the table, 
literally. I was about 7–8 years old at the time. On Sundays, which were the busiest market days, 
I would go to help my brothers because the market was full with shoppers, as families—many of 
them from the surrounding villages—came with their children to shop.  
My brothers worked outside their stores, behind big table counters. These tables—perhaps 
about 3.5 meters long and 1.5 meters wide—were enclosed from around and thus were used for 
storing merchandise. The table counters were covered with merchandise for sale: piles of shirts, 
pants, socks, etc. Shoes would be scattered between these piles. 
My job was to sit inside the table (which was quite easy for me as I was skinny and small) 
and help my brothers make on-the-spot instantaneous adjustments of shoe prices. I was equipped 
with a simple metallic device with rotating sharp heads with numeric stamps which I could use to 
mark any price on the bottom of the shoe. 
A customer would come and look at the shoes displayed on the table, which typically 
would be quite large or really small in size, and which would have no price on it. The customer 
would ask if we had the shoes in size 43, for example. My brother would at first say: “No, we are 
out of them.” Given the constant shortage of goods and services Georgians were used to this kind 
                                                 
10 For an overview of corruption, and types of corruption, see Aidt (2003). 
11 This is precisely the type of hierarchical rent-seeking described by Hillman and Katz (1987). Marjit, et al. (2000) suggest that 
existence of such strategic interactions between law enforcement agents on the one hand and the criminals on the other make 
standard anti-corruption policy prescriptions quite ineffective. See also Klitgaard (1988). 
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of answer which would therefore not be surprising. 
However, most of the customers would also know that at this point, if you truly want the 
merchandise, you must insist that the seller re-check his inventory, since perhaps there is “one 
last pair” of size 43 shoes left. Based on how strong and how persistent the customer was in his 
or her request, my brother would guess the price the customer would be willing to pay, i.e., he 
would intuitively try to assess the customer's price elasticity. Finally, my brother would bend and 
“start looking” for the appropriately sized shoes under the table. I already had the shoes ready as I 
could hear the entire conversation, and my brother would whisper to me the price that he wanted 
me to mark on the shoes. Within a few seconds, “he would be done searching for the shoes,” and 
luckily, “he would find one last pair” of the requested size.12 
These and other types of black market activities we were engaged in were possible only 
because at the official prices there was an excess demand, which gave us the incentive to adjust 
the prices endogenously to clear the market. The under-the-table instantaneous price adjustment 
mechanism ensured that the goods that were in excess demand ended up in the hands of those 
who valued them most. The under-the-table price adjustment mechanism, therefore, was a form 
of first degree price discrimination. 
 
2.5 Counterfeit merchandise 
My brothers were also engaged in buying and selling of counterfeit merchandise. The 
merchandise would be illegally produced by the same government production facilities that 
produced the “official” merchandise. However, unlike most of the counterfeit merchandise that 
one may purchase, for example, at the New York’s Counterfeit Alley along the Broadway Street 
in midtown Manhattan,13 the quality of our counterfeit merchandise was identical to the quality of 
the original. For any practical purpose, therefore, the officially manufactured merchandise and 
the counterfeit merchandise were identical. The only difference was that the production of the 
counterfeit merchandise would never be reported and thus, as far as government officials were 
concerned, they “had no knowledge” of its production. 
My brothers would purchase the merchandise from the manufacturing plant employees at 
                                                 
12 This story is quite ironic when I consider my current work. I am currently an Economics Professor and my main research area is 
studying pricing and price-setting within the New Keynesian framework. The specific themes I study include price rigidity and 
flexibility, size and frequency of price adjustment, cost of price adjustment, menu costs, etc. For example, last few years, I have 
been conducting research about how much it costs to change the prices at large US supermarket chains or at large US 
manufacturing firms. See, for example, Levy, et al. (1997, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2007), Dutta, et al. (1999 and 2002), Levy and 
Young (2004), and Zbaracki, et al. (2004, 2006). It is ironic when I think what I was doing as a 7-year old boy in Georgia: I was 
involved in adjusting the prices of various consumer goods and at least once, even incurring a real cost of price adjustment, i.e., a 
real menu cost: I was arrested by the local police. My crime: illegally inflating the government set prices. My punishment: few 
hours of jail-time, until my father came to the police station, and paid 150 Rubles along with 2 liters of home-made chacha to the 
local police chief. 
13 See Confessore (2006) for a detailed description of the New York City’s Counterfeit Alley. 
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a low cost. For example, an exact duplicate of “officially produced” shirts with an official 
consumer price tag of 3 Rubles could be purchased illegally for 0.50–1.50 Rubles, depending on 
the quantity purchased, and could be sold for as much as 8–10 Rubles. For the manufacturing 
plant employees, these were very profitable transactions, as they pocketed all the revenue they 
obtained from these transactions, but incurred no cost, essentially stealing from the government 
owned factories.14 Obviously, they had to incur the overhead cost of bribing the higher-level 
management and government officials. 
Thus, my brothers’ store would receive an official delivery of 50 shirts, for example. If 
these shirts were popular, then my brothers would purchase and sell as many as 500–1,500 
counterfeit copies of the shirts within 2–3 weeks, while the official merchandise would remain on 
store shelves, most of it unsold. 
 
2.6 Artificial shortages 
To inflate the official prices more easily, my brothers would often create artificial 
shortages, as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993).15 In their model, Shleifer and 
Vishny describe socialist industry consisting of a decision maker who expresses the combined 
interests of the bureaucrats and the managers. Because such an industry does not keep any of the 
profits (the government takes it all as if the tax rate is 100 percent), the magnitude of the official 
profits are of no consequence to the decision maker, and therefore the industry has no interest in 
charging an official price (which equals the monopoly price) and the monopoly output. Such an 
industry can make profits only if it creates a shortage of the good it produces and then uses its 
monopoly power to collect rents in the form of bribes, inflated prices, or side payments from 
quantity-constrained consumers. Thus, in Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992, 1993) model, a 
government official with monopoly power has incentives to create artificial shortages at the 
official price, and then collect bribes as a way to clear the market for the government-supplied 
good.16 
The method my brothers used was essentially the same, except that the price markup over 
the official price played the role of bribes. The creation of artificial shortages was typically 
                                                 
14 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) discuss a bribe model with theft in which a corrupt government official hides the sale of a 
government-provided good or service (e.g., road, import license, passport, etc.) all together and pockets the entire amount. In this 
type of scenario, Shleifer and Vishny show, the interests of buyers (the consumers who have to bribe a government official) and 
the sellers (the government officials) are aligned.     
15 Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 1993) suggest that many types of restrictive regulations exist for the sole purpose of giving the 
public officials in charge the power and the opportunity to extract rents (e.g., bribes) from the rationed consumers. For example, 
when a Moscow taxi driver was asked “…why all the most convenient turns seem to be prohibited on Moscow roads, resulting in 
huge traffic jams…[his reply was]…so that policemen can collect the most bribes from the violators” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, 
p. 238). 
16 For other (perhaps more traditional) explanations for the persistence of shortages in socialist economies, see Lange (1936), 
Weitzman (1977), and Kornai (1979). See also Rotemberg (1988), and Abouchar (1977) and the studies included therein. 
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limited to products that were especially popular, such as imported clothing (e.g., shirts, pants, 
shoes, etc. from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, etc.), imported food (e.g., Hungarian and 
Bulgarian made canned food), and some domestically produced products that were in constant 
shortage.17 
Galoshes are a good example of a domestically produced product for which demand was 
always high and that was constantly in a short supply. Galoshes are overshoes made of rubber 
and were popular during rainy winter days, especially amongst the peasants and villagers who 
would often use them as ordinary shoes for working in the field or for walking on the unpaved 
roads of their villages, because they were unable to afford real shoes. 
Supplies of galoshes would arrive to the store 2–3 times a year, and there was always a 
huge demand for them. People would hurry to stores asking for galoshes but on my brothers’ 
table counters they would find only a single left shoe or only a single right shoe, and when they 
would ask whether there are galoshes of size 3 or 4 or 5, etc., they would receive a very typical 
answer: “No, we are out of them.”  
If they insisted, however, then my brother would give them a hint: “Well, I do not have 
any galoshes left, but I can send my little brother to another store, and he might be able to obtain 
a pair of galoshes of the size you want, but the price will probably be 8–10 Rubles. Also, you will 
have to give the boy 2–3 Rubles as a gift.” They would always agree to the terms of this deal. 
And of course, I would always manage to obtain for them the right size galoshes in 5 minutes, 
often with a profit of as much as 400 to 500 percent. The buyers were happy to receive the 
galoshes, even at the higher price. 
 
2.7 Human temptations 
Taking advantage of human temptations was a norm in Georgia. For example, when the 
store received a delivery of cheap plastic wallets, my brother would put just one wallet on the 
edge of his merchandise table, making it appear as if it had been left there by accident by one of 
the shoppers. Customers approaching the table counter would notice the wallet, and indeed 
assume that it was left accidentally by one of the shoppers. My brother would pretend that he has 
not noticed the wallet.  In this type of situation, many customers would pretend that they are 
looking at the merchandise, quietly pick up the wallet and put it in a purse or in a pocket. At that 
point my brother would politely inform them: “Sir/Madam, the wallet you just took costs 6 
Rubles.” Most of the customers would pretend that they intended to buy it, and pay the 
                                                 
17 In Georgia, any product would sell at a premium regardless of its quality, as long as it had anything inscribed on it in any 
foreign language, i.e., in any language other than Georgian or Russian. Imported goods, therefore, were amongst the most 
demanded products. 
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outrageously high price, as otherwise they would be admitting that they were thieves. 
 
2.8 Fixed versus variable tax  
The profit-sharing arrangement my brothers had with the government authorities was in 
some sense a form of tax payment arrangement, where my brothers paid tax on a regular basis on 
the profits earned on every item sold.18 This was a variable tax, variable in the sense that the tax 
payments were linked to the quantity sold: the greater were the quantity sold at the inflated price, 
the higher the tax payments were. 
There was another taxation mechanism that was quite popular in Tskhakaya, which was 
more like a fixed tax. This tax collection mechanism was implemented by the local police force 
in the form of periodic raids they would conduct on shops, stores, and other businesses. The 
police would come and, given their knowledge of the illegal activities that were taking place at 
these establishments, they would look for a “smoking gun.” For example, they would look for 
items with inflated prices. When these raids occurred, the store manager would quickly organize 
with the store employees and they would instantly collect money to bribe the visiting police 
officers. The sums would range between 600–800 Rubles. 
There was another mechanism that was often used with the same goal in mind. A 
policeman would pick a customer whom my brothers would not suspect. The customer would be 
send to my brother’s “ducani” (a store in Georgian) to purchase some product for which the price 
was inflated. The customer would buy such a product and leave, but later he or she would return 
with the purchased merchandise, and accompanied by the policeman. On one such occasion, one 
of my brothers saw his customer was approaching him holding the blouse she has purchased just 
few minutes before, and she was escorted by a policeman. Instinctively, he ran away, and 
managed to leave the bazari’s grounds despite the police’s attempts to quickly seal the market 
and capture him. It turns out that this particular policeman was an honest policeman, a true 
communist, a non-corruptible policeman (an oxymoron in Georgia!). My brother, therefore, had 
to go in hiding for several weeks while the police was searching for him. In parallel, my father 
was trying to influence this policeman through other (corrupt) police officers. These policemen 
were paid 1,500 Rubles (which was considered very high price) to convince their fellow police 
officer to stop chasing my brother. 
A raid of similar type took place at an illegal shoe manufacturing facility where one of my 
brothers was working. The business was located in a residential neighborhood and it was 
                                                 
18 These payments do not constitute an ordinary tax, however, as they would never end at the tax revenue office. Instead, they 
went to individual policemen and government officials for their private use and benefit, not for the benefit of the general public. 
Hillman and Schnytzer (1986) refer to these types of payments as “overhead expenditures” or “overhead costs.” 
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producing men’s and women’s shoes. The shoe materials were pre-cut somewhere else and at this 
facility the shoes were manually assembled by about dozen workers. This was an illegal 
operation because in the USSR nobody was allowed to engage in private manufacturing. 
In 1966, when my brother was 23 years old, the shop was raided by the city’s chief 
investigative policeman. The policeman came to the shop with a large truck and loaded it with all 
the materials and merchandise that he found in the shop. However, my brother as well as several 
other employees managed to escape. He went to a friend’s house and from there to the train 
station and there he took a train to my aunt who lived in Suhumi, the capital of Abkhazia. There 
he stayed for 3 days, until he learned that it was safe to return home, which meant that bribes 
were paid to the right people, in this case to the chief investigative policeman. Upon his return, 
my brother learned that the raid was the chief policeman’s personal initiative, a part of his annual 
“tax collection tour” for the welfare and well being of his family. 
Such periodic raids would take place once every 6–12 months, and the payments we were 
expected to make served as a form of periodic “fixed tax” payments. As always, the payments 
that my brothers made to the local police force would also reach the functionaries and the 
bureaucrats of higher government authorities, as their fair share of the “tax proceeds.” 
There were also annual visits from kantora, the office in charge of monitoring the 
accounting affairs of government owned businesses. The goal of these visits was to audit the 
inventory and the accounting balances to ensure that no merchandise or money was missing. In 
addition to these pre-announced visits, there were also surprise visits from the kantora, which 
were particularly dangerous because stores could be easily caught with counterfeit merchandise 
or with merchandise with inflated prices. During such visits, the store would be closed for a day 
or two, while the kantora officials counted the merchandise and the sales records, and compared 
them to the information they had in their records. 
These types of visits gave the kantora officials opportunities to extract rents from the 
store management. Although the visits were made only once or twice a year, when they came to 
town, they would stay for 2–3 weeks and audit perhaps as many as a dozen different stores. The 
practical aspects of the bribing mechanisms that were typically used in these settings were quite 
efficient. After all, the entire process was corrupt, and nobody had interest in devoting too much 
time to haggling about what would be the right and fair bribe rate for each individual store. Such 
haggling could compromise the discretion of the entire process. 
The kantora officials, therefore, did not negotiate individual store bribe rates. Instead, the 
management of the stores that were raided/visited, would quickly meet, collect a large sum of 
money, perhaps as much as 5,000–10,000 Rubles in total (about 1,000 Rubles per store), and a 
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designated person—typically someone who personally knew one of the kantora officials—would 
take the money to the official at the hotel as a “gift and a token of appreciation from the local 
business community.” 
The process of jointly bribing the kantora’s officials was far more efficient than an 
alternative mechanism where each individual store manager makes individual store bribe 
payments. That is because the bribe payments were all collected and channeled together to the 
kantora officials similar to the way that banks channel individual savers’ funds to investors, 
substantially reducing the transaction cost. After such payments were made, any discrepancies 
and problems that were found during the audit of the stores were suppressed and never included 
in the final report. If it was determined that there was money missing, then obviously the store 
management had to resolve it. However, other types of problems such as over-priced 
merchandise, counterfeit merchandise, etc. would be completely overlooked and never reported.  
 
2.9 The power of “chacha” 
One of the most remarkable things about Russia, and perhaps about the rest of the USSR, 
was the unusually high purchasing power of homemade vodka, or chacha in Georgian. My father, 
like other Georgians, used to make chacha from the remains of grapes, after making wine from 
them. The quality of chacha was determined by pouring it on a plate and throwing in a burning 
match. If it caught fire, then it was of a high quality. In other words, it was a… pure alcohol, no 
different than… after-shave.19 
Now, with such home made vodka, one could obtain in Russia everything and anything, 
from domestically grown produce to imported consumer goods to machine guns, etc.20 We 
discovered that with home made vodka we could accomplish a lot even in Georgia. One of my 
brothers, for example, paid two bottles of chacha to his school teacher to have his high school 
diploma grades improved. In 1970, my father used 4 liters of homemade chacha along with 400 
Rubles to have our home connected to the town’s electric grid, which by the way, was supposed 
to be done for free. 
                                                 
19 According to a recent report in the Tel-Aviv edition of the International Herald Tribute, Iranians, like the Georgians, have been 
producing, bottling and selling home-made vodka and wine for centuries. It turns out that despite the increased attempts by the 
Iranian authorities to enforce the existing laws that prohibit the consumption of alcohol, Iranians apparently are consuming 
bootleg home-made vodka and wine in increasing quantities. According to the article, some young Iranian entrepreneurs are even 
engaged in the highly risky business of delivering the outlawed drinks on scooters to their clients’ homes, which points at the 
universality of the laws that govern humans’ response to incentives. See Fathi (2006).  
20 A common perception in Georgia was that chacha’s purchasing power in Russia was far greater than in Georgia. We discovered 
in 1971 that this was indeed the case when we were leaving Soviet Union. On the way from Georgia to Tel-Aviv, we passed 
through Moscow and later through Brest, and we discovered that we could accomplish so much more in these two cities by using 
chacha, substantially more than in Georgia. For example, various types of bribes that we had to make in “chacha units” in Russia 
were much lower than in Georgia for similar kinds of goods or services. The main reason for this discrepancy in the vodka’s 
purchasing power was the Russians’ love for vodka. They valued it far more than Georgians. For Georgians, wine always ranked 
first. The purchasing power of vodka, therefore, was far lower in Georgia than in Russia. 
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To have one of my brothers accepted to an evening school, all my father had to do was to 
pay a late night visit to the school director’s home and bring along 2 liters of home made chacha. 
We sometimes went to a doctor’s office with a bottle of home made wine, although wine was not 
as popular as chacha as a means for making bribe payments, and thus its purchasing power was 
far lower. However, my father’s homemade wine was considered pure (he never used any 
additives) and of a superb quality, and the entire town knew about it.21 My father’s homemade 
wine, therefore, was capable of helping us in many of our economic transactions. In particular, 
about 5 liters of it, along with a payment of 1,500 Rubles to the Military Commissariat’s officers, 
were sufficient for one of my brothers to obtain an exemption from serving in the Soviet military 
during a peace-time period. During war time, no amount of money, vodka, or wine would help: 
everybody would be mobilized for the Soviet military. 
 
2.10 Barter exchange  
Transactions involving barter exchanges were not limited to chacha and homemade wine. 
Although chacha and wine were sometimes used in bribing as a form of commodity money, they 
typically served more as a supplementary side-gift, while monetary payments comprised the main 
component of a bribe.22 Barter, however, was common in Soviet Georgia. Along with other 
people in our town, we routinely exchanged goods and services. These exchanges were illegal, as 
they took place outside the official markets, typically involving goods and services that were 
produced outside the official production plans and facilities. Also, the transaction prices differed 
from the official prices, as they varied from transaction to transaction. 
For example, my father and one of my brothers (as well as one of my uncles) worked as 
glazers, which meant that they would install glass (or replace if broken) in windows, picture 
frames, etc. Sometimes people came to our house with a picture frame or with a window frame 
and my father or my brother would cut glass and install it in these frames. But, most often, my 
father and brother would go around in the streets of our town as well as the surrounding villages 
and towns, carrying several quite heavy and large pieces of glass, often as large a 1.5m by 0.80m 
each, on their shoulders, and offering their services to people. In exchange for their services, my 
father and brother would be often offered payment in kind. These would include homemade 
                                                 
21 We used to make the wine at home, which was allowed because it was a form of private activity, no different from home-
cooking. The men and the boys of the house would wash their feet, while the women would wash the grapes. And then, the men 
and the boys would jump into giant pots and trample the grapes. The resulting grape juice would be kept in jars for 4–5 years, 
while passing it through a periodic filtering process using simple cheesecloth. After 5 years, the wine would be ready. During a 
visit to Tel-Aviv’s Museum Haaretz, the tour guide explained how Byzantines used to make wine. The guide was amused to hear 
that we used to make wine in Georgia “the Byzantine way” as recently as 35 years ago. 
22 Thus, although chacha did serve in Georgia at times as a commodity money, it did not attain the same degree of universal 
acceptance as cigarettes did at the P.O.W camp according to Radford’s (1945) account, or as red Mexican dry beans did in barter 
exchange market simulations according to Levy and Bergen’s (1993) and Fried and Levy’s (1995) account. 
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cheese, various types of fruits and vegetables, dry beans, dry fish, etc. Other barter transactions 
would include dental services, carpentry projects, used clothing, medicine, etc.23 
 
2.11 Cost of praying  
Religious practice was officially outlawed in the former Soviet Union. Instead, in Georgia 
as in much of the former USSR, Lenin, Marx, and Engels were the gods and their teachings (e.g., 
the Communist Manifesto) were the bible. Nevertheless, the city Jews somehow found a way to 
have the authorities allow the local Jewish community to build a synagogue. It was quite strange, 
however: the signs at the entrance to the synagogue indicated that it was prohibited to pray there. 
It was supposed to be a place for social gathering only. 
We, however, practiced our religion and were able to hold regular daily prayer services at 
the synagogue because the local congregation collected money on a regular basis and arranged a 
generous bribe payments to the local city and police authorities. Thanks to small extra payments, 
they even permitted the families to bring along their kids to the Sabbath services. 
Peoples of other religions, including Christians and Muslims, faced similar restrictions, 
although it seemed that Christianity was sometimes more tolerated than the other religions. That 
is particularly true for the Georgian Orthodox church, which at times was allowed to function 
almost freely. For example, during World War II, it was allowed greater autonomy in running its 
affairs in return for the church’s call to its members to support the war effort. 
In general, however, the Soviet rulers actively encouraged atheism, and brought severe 
purges upon the Georgian church hierarchy and frequent repression of Orthodox worship. In 
many parts of Soviet Union, including in Georgia, churches, mosques, and synagogues were 
destroyed or converted into secular buildings. Many churches that were particularly old (e.g., 
from the 11th–16th century), were converted into museums.24 Consequently, people often 
practiced their religion in their own private homes in small groups.25 
                                                 
23 According to Demetriou (2002), during the recent transition period, grenades, machine guns, and other types of small arms 
served as a medium of exchange in Georgia. Demetriou (2002, p. 16) reports that “According to several sources, weapons during 
the conflict and the early post-conflict period in effect served as a form of currency in a barter-dominated economy. 
Hyperinflation in Russia during that time meant that Russian rubles (Georgia’s currency until 1995) were an unstable medium of 
exchange. Because they [the weapons] were available in large (and constant) quantities and not sensitive to fluctuations in the 
currency market, weapons thus substituted for the ruble to a certain degree. One teacher of English in Tbilisi [the capital of 
Georgia], for instance, recollected having been paid in grenades for lessons he had provided to an elderly woman. Similarly, the 
Mkhedrioni [a Georgian paramilitary group and political organisation outlawed since 1995 but subsequently reconstituted as the 
Union of Patriots political party] were able to acquire significant influence in criminal and political clientalistic networks through 
the distribution of weapons as “gifts” to powerful underground figures, economic directors, and political patrons.” 
24 See, for example, Kaiser (1997), and “Unit 9: Religious History – Georgia” at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/nis/index.html. 
25 For example, in the late 1960s our city synagogue was burned by arsonists. When the construction of the new synagogue 
building was completed, it was taken by the authorities and converted into a soft-drink manufacturing plant. Having no place of 
worship, the local Jews would often gather in our house to hold religious services. According to some accounts, Islam survived in 
the USSR thanks to the ability of the Muslims to practice their religion at home. (Source: 
http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/departments/soc-swk/ree/MALIK2.html). 
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2.12 Cost of exit visa  
In 1971 my family left the Republic of Georgia for good and immigrated to Israel. The 
process of obtaining the exit visa was full of hurdles and obstacles that without side-payments 
would be impossible to overcome. It began with an “invitation” from the Government of Israel. 
The invitation was necessary for requesting an emigration permit.26 The invitation was arranged 
through other emigrants who had left Georgia before us. 
When the invitation arrived at the local post office, the post office director saw a profit 
opportunity. This was the standard practice: every time a letter came from overseas, usually from 
a family in Israel, the postman would come to our house, and tell my parents quite directly and 
explicitly: “I have a letter for you from Israel. How much are you willing to pay for it?” 
Typically, one or two shots of chacha along with 50.00 Rubles would suffice. 
The value of an invitation from the government of Israel, however, was much higher than 
a single family letter. The post office director recognized this and took advantage of this profit 
opportunity, given his monopoly power over releasing the letter. In the end, it cost the family 
close to 600.00 Rubles to obtain the document from the post office.27 This, however, was only the 
beginning. The employees of the local office that issued birth certificates were unable to locate 
our birth certificates. However, a bribe payment of 150.00 Rubles per certificate helped them 
locate the lost certificates. 
Then there was a passport office in Tbilisi. There we were sure that we would be expected 
to make a substantial contribution towards the happiness and welfare of the passport office head 
and his family. It turns out, however, that the person in charge was originally from Tskhakaya, a 
former star in the town’s soccer team. He recognized my father and my brothers and told them 
that he is not going to take any money from “his old comrades.”28 That was a huge saving for the 
family. 
The last encounter we had with Soviet authorities was in the city of Brest, on the border 
between Belarus and Poland. This was our point of departure from Soviet Union to Israel. The 
Soviets did not allow emigrants to take with them many of their possessions. The border police in 
Brest, however, were more than willing to allow us to stuff the boxes we wanted to ship with 
                                                 
26 According to a recent report of Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org), the former republics of the USSR have almost 
completely eliminated the need to obtain an invitation from a foreign government to travel abroad or to emigrate. 
27 Because the post office director was a monopolist in this case, the “price” we ended up paying for the invitation letter primarily 
reflected my family’s ability to pay.  
28 This is similar to the “identifiable victim effect” (Loewenstein, et al., 2007; Small and Loewenstein, 2003), which predicts that 
a greater sympathy will be shown towards identifiable than statistical victim. In the case of Georgia, it appears that it was “ok” to 
cheat or to steal from someone who you did not know in person. Social norms, however, prohibited acting dishonestly with people 
whom you knew in person.   
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anything we wanted, all in exchange for just one bottle of chacha per policeman. 
 
2.13 Labor markets  
In Georgia a person could only be employed by the government. No private enterprise 
was allowed. Even if one had a job that in the west would be described as self-employment, in 
Georgia he or she had to be registered at a government office, called arteli, which was considered 
his official employer. 
For example, my father and one of my brothers were registered with the local arteli as 
glazers. In theory this meant that arteli’s officials could tell them what to do. For example, they 
could keep them busy by sending them to various government construction projects where 
glazers were needed. In addition, because arteli was their official employer, they were supposed 
to receive their monthly salary from arteli. Officially, they were not supposed to sell their 
services to private individuals. 
All these rules were only in theory, however. That is because, like most of the self-
employed people, my dad had also bribed (quite generously) the arteli’s key officials, and 
therefore he was rarely called to government run projects. In the rare occasions that he was 
called, he was rewarded by receiving fairly large quantities of uncut glass for his private business 
use. For example, periodically he would be called to a government construction project to install 
window glasses. These sites usually would have large supplies of glass, and the construction 
supervisors at these sites would often offer him to take some of the uncut glass for private use, 
because they would almost always receive deliveries of construction materials in excess 
quantities.  
But, perhaps more importantly, thanks to the bribe payments, my father was permitted to 
sell his glazing services to private individuals quite openly. Moreover, he never reported his 
income to the arteli’s officials, despite the strict regulations that required full reporting of all 
incomes from all private transactions. In fact, each “self-employed” employee of arteli was 
required by the Soviet labor and employment laws to hand in all the income he or she has earned 
from private transactions. That would count as his or her contribution to the benefit of the 
proletariat. In return, the employed would receive the government prescribed 30–60 Rubles, the 
monthly salary. Thus, arteli was a guild-like association that extracted a tax for membership. 
Now, as far as we know, nobody ever handed in their privately earned income to arteli. 
The entire thing was a big joke. Arteli’s apparatus was full of rent-seeking bureaucrats whose 
chief goal was to reach as many independent, self-employed individuals as possible to extract 
rents. My father, for example, would go to arteli’s offices towards the end of each month and 
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would report and hand in his 30-Ruble privately earned income for the previous month. Needless 
to say that nobody would ever question the accuracy of his reported income, which always was 
ridiculously low. In exchange, my father would receive his monthly 30 Ruble salary from arteli. 
Of course, the monthly salary payment from arteli was quite minor in comparison to the actual 
income he regularly earned from his private glazing works. By the mid 1960s, my father got tired 
of these games, and with an additional lump-sum bribe payment, he obtained a permanent 
exemption from ever reporting to arteli. Later on, he obtained similar exemptions for my brother 
and my uncle. 
 
3. Was corruption in Georgia efficient?  
According to one point of view in the literature, corruption can be efficient under some 
circumstances. See, for example, Leff (1964), Huntington (1968), Lui (1985), Beck and Maher 
(1986), Lien (1986), Aidt, et al (2005). According to this view, in economies where the economic 
dominance of government-run monopolies along with bureaucratic rigidities leads to inefficient 
outcomes (e.g., to constant shortages), corruption can serve as a means for achieving a higher 
degree of economic efficiency by “greasing the wheels” of government and overcoming 
cumbersome government bureaucratic regulations (red tape) by giving the bureaucrats the 
incentive to make their work more efficient despite the institutional and bureaucratic rigidities 
under which they operate (Blackburn, et al. 2006).29  
In Georgia’s centrally planned command economy, the government officials and 
bureaucrats were the ones that made the decisions of what will be produced, how much will be 
produced, and for whom will be produced. Thus, in Georgia, one of the main causes of corruption 
was state control over the distribution of the basic resources. The control manifested itself in the 
cumbersome and inefficient state management system, which made it impossible for individuals 
to obtain any service from the government without paying a visit to dozens of government 
officials in various offices. The state control over all economic decisions also resulted in constant 
shortages of goods and services. In the absence of free markets with flexible price and wage 
system, Georgian decision makers had to find ways around the restrictions imposed by the 
centrally planned economic structure, and its inefficient price system. In Georgia, therefore, the 
problems created by central planning were resolved, at least in part, by developing a black 
market, a parallel market where many goods and services were traded outside the official 
markets. 
Clearly, the corrupt black market activities in Georgia’s economy had direct distributional 
                                                 
29 Bardhan (1997) questions these types of arguments on conceptual grounds. 
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effects as people were stealing from one another and from the state. But there were also indirect 
distributional effects through externalities. For example, the money that individual profit seekers 
routinely pocketed, could in principle be used for a common good if it were to reach the 
country’s treasury. However, it is more than likely that the corrupt economic activities of 
Georgian people were socially costly as well because significant amount of resources were 
devoted to the management of illegal black market activities and to the efforts to cover them up.  
Nevertheless, while more data are needed to give a clear answer to the question this 
section asks, it seems clear that the corruption allowed the Georgian economy to produce far 
more output than would be produced otherwise. As in the case of Food Store Five of Hillman and 
Schnytzer (1986), the corrupt rent-seeking activities in Georgia enabled the economy to sustain 
production. Therefore, to the extent that illegal black market activities allowed greater production 
and consumption of goods and services, and assuming that the centralized market structure was 
exogenously imposed on Georgians (Aidt, 2003), the corruption in Georgia likely was efficiency-
enhancing.  
 
4. Ethical and moral aspects of the corruption in Georgia  
A reader might wonder why we behaved as we did. The answer to this hard question is 
actually quite simple and twofold. First, we had no choice. There was no other way a family 
could live and survive in Georgia without being engaged in these types of illegal activities.30 
Second, and perhaps not less important, it was the norm. Everybody was doing it, and that 
provided ethical and moral justification for our actions without feeling too much guilt or 
embarrassment about it. The society saw this as a necessary evil, and usually blamed the regime 
for it. Therefore from the point of view of ethics, bribing, mark-up pricing, side-payments in cash 
and in kind, and other similar kind of black market activities were not considered immoral. To 
the contrary, it was considered perfectly normal, and a part of the everyday life in the former 
                                                 
30 A reader might have the impression that, given the sophisticated schemes, cheatings, rip offs, etc., in which some of my family 
members were engaged, our family must have been quite wealthy. The truth, however, is quite opposite. Most of the income the 
family earned was spent on food and other necessities and not much was left for anything else. That is primarily because we were 
a family with ten children. Consider the following: unlike our neighbors, we did not have running water (which means that we did 
not have showers, flushing toilets, etc.). Also unlike our neighbors, we did not have a refrigerator, a washing machine, a gas 
burner, an electric oven, a telephone, a TV (we often went to our neighbors to watch a soccer game on TV), nor any other 
standard home appliance. In fact, we did not even have electricity until 1970, about a year before we left the Soviet Union. Until 
then, we were completely dependent on candle-light and kerosene-lamps. We rarely purchased new clothes. As far back as I 
remember, I always wore my older brothers’ clothes. They also wore used clothes, which came from various second hand sources 
(e.g., wealthy families). We always purchased black bread because it was cheaper. We would eat chicken once a week, and beef 
perhaps once every few weeks. Because robber boots were too expensive, in cold Georgian winters we often wore galoshes, 
which were very inefficient when snow accumulated. For many years, we played using a home-made soccer ball because a real 
soccer ball was too expensive. Soccer shoes, which most of my friends had, were out of question! None of my siblings attended 
an institute of higher education in Georgia because my parents could not afford it: the necessary bribe rate was too high. The 
family had to save all year long for my mother’s annual summer trip to various mineral water sources because mineral water was 
considered good for diabetics. In short, our living standard was quite low, to say the least.   
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Soviet Union. Even worse types of crimes, such as stealing, cheating, ripping offs, etc., which 
would be considered ethically less defensible to most people under normal circumstances, were 
considered socially acceptable in Georgia as long as the thief had no personal knowledge of the 
person he was stealing from. Unwritten social rules prohibited stealing from people you knew in 
person, such as friends, neighbors, co-workers, etc. The current President of Georgia, Mikhail 
Saakashvili has said: “Georgia was a very corrupt country. Sometimes people don’t believe that it 
was corrupt because it was part of culture” (my emphasis).31 
Georgia is still considered one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The existing 
evidence, however, suggests that corruption is not limited to underdeveloped and developing 
countries. There is ample evidence about existence of corruption in developed countries as well 
(Elliott, 1997; Glynn, et al. 1997; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Rodrik and Rauch, 1997).32 For 
example, some of the Western European countries, such as Italy and Greece, as well as some 
other highly developed countries such as Japan and Korea, are well-known for the political and 
economic corruption. There is evidence about corruption in the US as well. For example, Glaeser 
and Saks (2006) use data on federal corruption convictions to study the causes and consequences 
of corruption in the US. According to their account, between 1990 and 2002, US federal 
prosecutors convicted more than 10,000 government officials of acts of corruption such as 
conflict of interest, fraud, campaign-finance violations, and obstruction of justice. Germany, as 
another example, also seems to have its share of corruption, as do France, Italy, and Japan 
(Pascha, 1999).33 
Most of these countries have decentralized and free market based economic systems to a 
varying degree. Nevertheless, the existence of corruption in these countries suggests that 
corruption has many possible sources, beyond a rigid centralized price system of the type that 
existed in Georgia. Indeed, scholars have noted numerous economic as well as non-economic 
causes for corruption (see Elliott, 1997 and the essays included therein). In some areas of 
commerce, corruption seems to be an ethically as well as socially acceptable norm, and this 
phenomenon is not limited to poor or developing countries. An example is the piracy of software, 
music and movies via sales of illegal copies, internet downloads, or just computer-to-computer 
                                                 
31 Source: “Georgian President Visits Atlanta,” Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s interview with Elina Fuhrman on the 
National Public Radio, Wednesday, August 11, 2004, NPR, available at the web site of Georgia’s Embassy in the US, 
http://www.georgiaemb.org/DisplayMedia.asp?id=355. Marjit, et al. (2000) make a similar suggestion: “It [corruption] is so 
pervasive that citizens in the developing part of the world have accepted it as a social rule” (p. 76). See also Ludwig and Kling 
(2006). 
32 We should point out, however, that the empirical evidence still suggests that the more developed countries tend to have less 
corruption (Treisman, 2000). 
33 According to Glynn, et al. (1997, pp. 22–23), “…corruption in Germany has by no means approached the ministers-for-sale 
levels seen in France and especially Italy… [however] a spate of scandals has dealt powerful blows to the German national self-
image, and corruption has emerged as an explosive issue for German politicians.” Also, according to the 1995 European Business 
Report, the German construction industry allegedly paid 10 billion marks to corrupt officials each year. 
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exchanges. Another part of that market, it turns out, also trades (sometimes quite openly) in 
illegal decoders and smart cards used to descramble encrypted satellite signals to access TV 
channels and other information sources. The remarkable aspect of these piracies and illegal 
activities is that they are very common and widespread in some of the most advanced countries, 
including such European countries as Norway and Sweden, countries that are presumably 
regarded as highly ethical.34 The persistence of such illegal activities in advanced countries 
suggests that corruption has strong elements of social norms, as suggested by Fisman and Miguel 
(2006). 
 
5. Generalizability of the evidence  
The cases and the events I have described are consistent with similar, although not as 
detailed, accounts offered by Simes (1975), Simis (1977, 1982), Grossman (1977), Bergson 
(1984), and Hillman and Schnytzer (1986). For example, according to Simis’ (1982, pp. 155–
156) account, in order to have his business survive in Georgia, one Food Store Five’s manager 
had to “…take money from the sales clerks, to sell goods at inflated prices, to cheat the 
customers, and, of course, to bribe the top people in the municipal administration, and all the 
store’s suppliers” [my emphasis]. This description summarizes quite well the types of activities 
many Georgians were engaged in, which suggests that the events I described above were not 
limited to my immediate family members or to the time period this paper covers. Indeed, the 
ways my family used to deal with the restrictions and inefficiencies of Georgian economy were 
not unique in the sense that all of our neighbors and friends had to adopt similar methods and 
techniques to survive. The anecdotal evidence I offer, therefore, is quite typical and generalizes to 
behavior in Georgia. 
Although it is well known that the other republics of the former Soviet Union were also 
corrupt, it is also well-known that Georgia was the most corrupt. It is unclear, therefore, whether 
the various types of unethical behavior I have described here, also existed in other places. I 
suspect that they did, but not to the same extent as in Georgia. Åslund (1997) emphasizes an 
important difference between the Central/Eastern European countries and the former Soviet 
republics. Åslund argues that there was much less rent-seeking in the Central and Eastern 
                                                 
34 According to the February 13, 2006 report of the International Intellectual Property Alliance, “Significant Internet source piracy 
infrastructure and group membership have flourished in Sweden due to this country’s notoriety as a piracy safe haven. Pirates 
have even established a Political Party—the “Piratpartiet”—which plans to participate in the general election later this year on a 
platform demanding the removal of national copyright laws. Topsites, highly specialized types of pirate servers with massive 
storage and extremely high bandwidth, are used by Encoding/Release Groups for the first release of pirated content on the 
Internet. This source content is then passed down … to Internet Relay Chat (IRC), Newsgroups and peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks…there are approximately 200 [Topsites] in the world and… 40% of the European sites of this type, are hosted in 
Sweden. The country has the largest number of direct connect hubs (P2P facilitators) and the most Direct Connect users in the 
world. Finally, Sweden is home to Rizon, one of the largest IRC networks in the world.” 
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European countries, which he ascribes to fewer economic distortions, more economic openness, 
better legal norms, better-functioning state institutions, and to stronger civil societies these 
countries had in comparison to the former Soviet Union, where the old elite had been and 
remained amazingly free of social controls.35 
An interesting issue (raised by one of the referees) concerns the difficulty of explaining 
the prevalence of corruption in Georgia circa 2006 in light of the fact that the economic system 
that gave rise to it has gone. Some of the corruption in Georgia may be transitional. As 
Huntington (1968), Kornai (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) observe, democratization of a 
country’s political and economic systems is often accompanied by increased rather than 
decreased corruption, or in the terminology of Hillman and Ursprung (2000), by increased rent 
seeking.36 
The corruption in Georgia seems to have a strong component of historical and social norm 
which likely is contributing to the persistence of corruption in today’s Georgia despite the recent 
political and economic reforms. The existence of these norms makes it unlikely that the 
corruption will disappear any time soon despite the current Georgian government’s extraordinary 
efforts. Existence of these types of social norms, customs and rules, therefore, suggest that 
Georgia and other countries like it could be stuck in a “corruption trap” for awhile.  
 
6. Anecdotal evidence – potential benefits 
Although corruption appears to be a widespread phenomenon across the globe, direct data 
on corruption and its prevalence is scarce because of its illegal nature. The absence of data can 
limit the attention that corruption-related problems receive in policy discussions.  
There seems to be plenty of anecdotal evidence about prevalence of corruption that is not 
or is rarely published in academic studies, perhaps because the economics discipline until 
recently tended to be in general unreceptive to anecdotal evidence. There are several possible 
reasons for this. One reason is that, because of its informal nature, anecdotal evidence is difficult 
to verify. Second, various forms of potential cognitive biases may affect the recollection or the 
presentation of such evidence. Also, some might consider anecdotal evidence statistically less 
reliable than other types of evidence because they do not necessarily represent a typical or an 
                                                 
35 Comments from one of the anonymous referees are consistent with this argument. For example, according to the referee (who 
apparently lived in one of the East European countries during the 1960–1980s), he/she has “… never seen or heard of any price 
manipulations such as described [in this paper] by the author with the exception of…” Similarly, the referee continues, “… 
regarding education, I have never heard or witnessed bribery at the elementary or high school level.” It turns out, however, that 
the referee’s home country had a relatively free market with little central planning. This could explain the lack of significant 
corruption in his/her country, as suggested by Åslund (1997). See also Treisman (2000). 
36 Consistent with these observations is the existing empirical evidence which shows that there is no simple correlation between 
the levels of democracy and corruption. See, for example, Johnston (1997) and the studies cited therein. See also Glynn, et al. 
(1997), Aidt and Dutta (2004), and Blackburn, et al. (2006).  
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average behavior.  
As mentioned above, however, increasing number of scholars recognizes the value of 
anecdotal evidence as a useful supplement to more standard and more commonly accepted 
statistical evidence, especially in situations where data from regular sources are non-existent. 
Anecdotal evidence offers information on the extent and frequency of corruption, which sheds 
light on the nature, causes, as well as consequences of corruption. Therefore, anecdotal evidence, 
if collected in substantial quantities and across many countries, can be fruitfully used as an input 
in improving the construction of various corruption indexes, such as the ICRGI, IMDI, and CPI, 
which already use anecdotal evidence obtained from surveys. 
 
7. Conclusion  
The former Soviet Union was a centrally planned economy, where government officials in 
principle made all the decisions for the people, decisions that in market economies are usually 
left to private individuals and to free markets that rely on a flexible wage and price system. The 
examples documented in this essay are based on first-hand accounts and suggest that individuals 
that operate in inefficient constrained environments have incentives to find ways around the 
constraints, even if that means taking risks by engaging in illegal activities. 
Although the period described in this study covers the years 1960–1971, the market 
structure and the social organization of the illegal economic activities that I have described 
existed in Georgia under the communist regime well before 1960s, as well as after 1971. While 
there were attempts to confront corruption, it turns out that many of these attempts were not real: 
they were what Hillman and Schnytzer (1986, p. 96) call “… purges… [that reflect] successful 
rent-seeking endeavor. The illegal activities underlying the rents continued with a newly 
specified property rights designation.”37 
Thus, the system, the police, and the government officials, all were corrupt. My family 
responded to market incentives and behaved in accord with norms. Indeed, my intention has been 
to describe the norms. 
Corruption and the black market mechanisms emerged endogenously in Georgia because 
the Soviets did not allow free markets. In parallel to the official market, well-functioning black 
markets developed. Many Georgians believed that Georgia itself was one big black market. 
                                                 
37 According to Human Rights Watch, the situation in Georgia in terms of corruption continued worsening until the “Rose 
Revolution,” when Shevardnadze was forced to resign on charges of corruption. However, the corruption in Georgia was so bad 
that I personally find it hard to see how it could get any worse. After all, anything corruptible was already corrupted. I, therefore, 
suspect that there was no significant increase in the corruption. Instead, I believe that with the continuous political reforms, more 
and more of the existing corruption was exposed and brought to public attention, which likely contributed substantially to the 
downfall of Shevardnadze.    
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Indeed, Georgian economy had prospered and Georgians were enjoying a relatively high standard 
of living in comparison to the rest of the Soviet Union, at least in part, thanks to the “free market 
institutions” that Georgians were able to establish and promote. For example, according to 
Tavartkiladze’s (1998) report produced for Helio International, the Georgian’s standard of living 
by the end of the Soviet era was one of the highest in the entire USSR. Similar assessments are 
reported by Åslund (1997) and Åslund, et al. (1996). 
Georgia was corrupt at all levels of government, beginning with the highest ranking 
communist party members in Tbilisi, all the way to the low-level office workers in small towns 
and cities. To achieve anything, bribing and making side-payments to the right government 
bureaucrats and functionaries, and quite often even to the local police officers, was necessary. 
Various types of profit sharing mechanisms that the Georgians have developed were designed in 
such a way that all participants had incentives to follow the unwritten rules. The system worked 
precisely because everybody benefited from it and nobody had incentive to disrupt its smooth 
functioning. Transactions were primarily driven by rent-seeking motives, which in turn gave the 
Georgians incentives to engage in productive activities despite the Georgia’s centralized market’s 
totalitarian constraints and limitations. 
These conclusions suggest that the true output of Georgia was significantly higher than 
the officially recorded state-produced output, which suggests that the true post-Soviet period 
depression in the output that occurred during the post-transition years from 1991 to 1995 was 
greater than originally thought.38 For example, according to Tavartkiladze (1998), GDP per capita 
in 1995 amounted to 483 Georgian Lari, equivalent of about $383, which is about 18 percent of 
the per capita output in 1990. Åslund, et al. (1996) and Åslund (1997) report a slightly lower 
estimate, about 14 percent. The anecdotal evidence offered in this paper suggests that the true 
decline in the output of Georgia was perhaps even sharper. 
Corruption continued to exist in Georgia even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
Georgian government did not begin taking serious anti-corruption measures until President 
Saakashvili rose to power in 2003.39 According to Transparency International’s CPI, as lately as 
in 2003, Georgia still was one of the most corrupt nations in the world—on a par with Tajikistan 
and Azerbaijan and outranked only by countries such as Myanmar, Haiti, and Paraguay. 
Was corruption in Georgia efficient? Georgians clearly spent a substantial amount of 
resources on the management and the cover up of corrupt economic activities. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
38 This assumes that the output during the mid 1990s was measured with greater precisions than before. The accuracy of this 
assumption, however, is hard to assess. 
39 For example, according to the 1998 estimates of the Georgian State Department of Statistics, the informal (or “black market”) 
economy contributes over one third of the country’s GDP (Tavartkiladze, 1998). 
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corruption allowed the Georgian economy to produce far more output than would have been 
produced otherwise and avoid the impoverishment that communism in general brought. The 
corruption in Georgia, therefore, likely was efficiency-enhancing. According to Huntington 
(1968, p. 386), “In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, 
over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid over-centralized, honest bureaucracy.” 
This may have been the case with Georgia. 
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